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This paper provides a uniﬁed theory of the economic and demographic transition. The
main mechanism is based on optimal decisions about fertility and time investments in hetero-
geneous types of human capital. These decisions depend on diﬀerent dimensions of health,
which themselves are endogenously determined in the process of development. By disen-
tangling the distinct roles that diﬀerent dimensions of health, such as adult longevity, child
mortality, and overall healthiness, play for education and fertility decisions, the model is able
to generate dynamics that can replicate the historical development pattern in the Western
world. The model generates an endogenous economic transition from a situation of sluggish
growth in incomes and productivity to a modern growth regime. Closely related, a demo-
graphic transition from high mortality and high fertility to low mortality and low fertility
arises, with an intermediate phase of increasing fertility despite falling mortality rates. The
model can generate a positive correlation between income and fertility during early stages of
development, as well as a decline net fertility in the last phase of the demographic transition,
and it provides a rationale for fertility declines that precede drops in child mortality.
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Transitions from stagnant economic environments to developed economies with permanent growth
and improving living conditions are often characterized by substantial changes in many di-
mensions of human life. In the Western world, for example, aggregate and per capita income
displayed a virtual explosion from the second half of the 18th century onwards, after almost stag-
nant development during the entire history. The changes that this transition brought about,
however, were not conﬁned to the economic domain only. Rather, this transition to modern
societies also involved changes in other important dimensions of the human environment and
indicators of general living conditions and health reﬂected in fertility behavior, population den-
sity, educational attainment, child mortality and adult longevity. In fact the economic transition
from stagnation to growth was closely related to a demographic transition from a regime charac-
terized by high child mortality, little longevity, large fertility, and a positive correlation between
living conditions and fertility, to a Modern Growth regime with large improvements in terms of
adult longevity, reduced child mortality and higher educational penetration, but also lower total
and even net fertility.1 The more recent episodes of escape from stagnation are characterized by
similar changes with the improvements in economic and living conditions being associated with
demographic transitions.
While human capital acquisition is usually seen as the main engine of economic development,
empirical ﬁndings suggest that health and longevity are the crucial determinants for human
capital acquisition. Several authors have emphasized the role of health and improved health
conditions for labor market participation and productivity, as well as for school attendance and
human capital acquisition, see e.g. Fogel (1994), Bleakley (2003) and Miguel and Kremer (2004).
Life expectancy of adults seems to be the key determinant of human capital acquisition and
income diﬀerences across countries, see Reis-Soares (2005) and Shastry and Weil (2003). This
claim is substantiated by the empirical ﬁndings of Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg (2005),
who provide evidence that life expectancy has a causal impact on economic development.
Closely related is the eﬀect of health on fertility behavior. While bad health conditions
reﬂected in high child mortality imply a high gross fertility in order to sustain a certain net
fertility rate and thus a stable population, improving child survival rates decrease gross fertility,
but have no clear a priori impact on net fertility. Most existing theories of fertility choice assume
an income-driven trade-oﬀ between quantity and quality of children along the lines of Barro and
Becker (1988 and 1989). In these models, declining child mortality predicts an increasing net
fertility rate along the economic transition. Moreover, there is an a priori ambiguous eﬀect of
adult longevity on fertility.
However, existing theories of the economic transition generate dynamics that are inconsistent
with empirical and historical evidence on the economic and demographic transition. Clark (2005)
argues that theories considering income changes as the driving force behind changes in fertility
behavior are problematic because they treat changes in human capital formation as consequence,
and not as a cause, of the economic and demographic transition. Increased human capital
accumulation before the economic transition is therefore diﬃcult to rationalize with existing
theories. Moav (2005) and Hazan and Zoabi (2005) point out that the role of adult longevity for
fertility behavior is diﬃcult to rationalize with a quantity-quality approach, because changes in
parent life expectancy leave the main trade-oﬀ essentially unchanged. But this cannot explain
the observed fall in net fertility. Similarly, Doepke (2005) argues that the decline in net fertility
rates is diﬃcult to rationalize by reductions in child mortality. Because of the income eﬀect
involved with optimal fertility choice, net fertility increases in that framework as mortality of
1Compare e.g. the data provided by Maddison (1991). We provide and discuss the empirical evidence for
England and Wales in section 5.
1children decreases.2 Kalemli-Ozcan (2002, 2003) investigates the role of uncertainty about child
survival in inducing forward looking parents to ’hoard’ children due to a precautionary motive.
In her model, a substitution eﬀect implies that gross fertility declines if child survival chances
increase. Still, this approach does not explain a fall in net fertility.3
A further criticism concerns the observed timing of events. Galor (2005) notes that in some
countries like England, fertility declined even before child mortality fell. This observation casts
doubt on causality running from from life expectancy to fertility.4 Moreover, adult longevity
began to increase well before the economic transition, preceding reductions in fertility by as
much as a century in some countries (see Lorentzen et al., 2005, and Galor, 2005). Also, in
some cases, fertility actually increased before the emergence a regime with low mortality and
declining fertility.5
Summing up, conventional theories based on the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ are diﬃcult to
reconcile with empirical observations. On top of that, the distinct roles played by diﬀerent
dimensions of health, reﬂected by child mortality, general health status, and adult longevity, for
development have not been investigated in a uniﬁed growth model. To our knowledge, there
exists no theoretical uniﬁed growth framework that investigates the the central role that health
and life expectancy seems to have for the transition according to the available empirical evidence,
and the interdependent feedback eﬀects with fertility behavior and economic development.
The object of this paper is to provide a uniﬁed theory in which the economic and demographic
transitions endogenously arise from the interactions between economic variables, in particular
human capital formation and technological improvements, and health in various contexts, re-
ﬂected by adult longevity, child mortality and overall health status. The model investigates
the role of health for education and fertility as well as for the evolution of the economy. The
model builds on the framework proposed by Cervellati and Sunde (2005), which studies how life
expectancy and development aﬀect individual education decisions. We generalize this frame-
work in several directions and investigate the dynamic evolution of fertility and human capital
formation by focussing attention to the role of the diﬀerent dimensions of health.
The diﬀerent dimensions of health considered in this paper aﬀect diﬀerent decisions. In
particular, health conditions reﬂected by child mortality are the major determinant of fertility
decisions. Health of adults, reﬂected by adult longevity, determines the horizon over which
human capital investments can amortize. Finally, the overall health status of an individual,
is reﬂected in his ability to use time for productive or recreative activities, and particularly
determines the time the individual needs to acquire human capital or to perform a certain task,
i.e., his or her productivity.
We consider an overlapping generations setting in which heterogenous adults, who have
successfully survived childhood, maximize their utility from consumption and from surviving
oﬀspring by making decisions on education and fertility. In particular, these adults decide which
type of human capital to acquire, how much time to spend on education and how many children
they want to raise. Both education and fertility are crucially aﬀected by adult longevity, which
individuals take as given. The probability that their children survive, which is also a state
variable, aﬀects fertility decisions. Dynamically, the human capital acquired by a generation
2This is the case since a reduction in child mortality increases the returns to quality and, given the assumed
complementarity, also the returns to quantity.
3Doepke (2005) shows that allowing for sequential fertility weakens the eﬀect of declining fertility from precau-
tionary demand for children as child mortality can be compensated by subsequent child births. He argues that the
precautionary motive cannot account for a sizable decline in net fertility and concludes that child mortality cannot
explain the fertility drop alone. Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg (2005) point out that sequential fertility does
not help replacing oﬀspring if children die as adults. If the demand for children is for old age support a decline
in (adult) mortality still induces a ”hoarding” motive.
4See alsoDoepke (2005) for a historical discussion.
5We discuss these inconsistencies and problems in more detail in section 3.
2of adults aﬀects the technology as well as living conditions in terms of adult longevity and
child mortality in the future. Changes in life expectancy and technology, in turn, aﬀect the
proﬁtability of investing in the diﬀerent types of human capital for those children, who survive
until adulthood.
As result, we present an analytical characterization of the transition from stagnation to
growth, which is based on the interplay between human capital formation, technological progress,
and health. A feedback between human capital, fertility and adult longevity is eventually trig-
gered when there are suﬃciently high returns to human capital for large fractions of the pop-
ulation to outweigh the cost in terms of lifetime spent on higher education. As a consequence
of a changing environment and education behavior, fertility behavior also changes. We identify
several opposing eﬀects. The income eﬀect, related to longevity, induces adults to have more
children, while the substitution eﬀect, related to child mortality, allows them to reduce the num-
ber of children. Finally, a diﬀerential fertility eﬀect arises because high skilled individuals, for
whom the opportunity cost of raising children is higher, give birth to fewer children. This eﬀect
gains momentum as larger fractions of the population decide to get higher education. The dy-
namic equilibrium path is consistent with the empirical and historical evidence on the economic
and demographic transitions. By simulating the model for illustrative purposes we show that
the behavior of key variables like adult longevity, infant mortality, gross and net fertility, and
literacy and income per capita are in line with empirical observations and historical evidence.
This paper thereby contributes to the recent literature on uniﬁed theories studying the de-
velopment process as being endogenously driven by the interaction between fertility behavior
and human capital.6 The seminal contribution by Galor and Weil (2000), which initiated the
literature on uniﬁed theories, adopted a modelling approach based on a quantity-quality trade-
oﬀ while Galor and Moav (2002) investigate the role of natural selection forces. According to
these theories, the decline in fertility came with a more intensive caring for children, a shift from
more quantity to more quality.7 In a more recent paper, Galor and Moav (2005) investigate
the role of changing environmental conditions, like population density, for longevity. They illus-
trate a mechanism of natural selection, which leads to more robust types of humans surviving
when environmental conditions are characterized by higher extrinsic mortality. At the same
time, fertility declines as more robust types spend more resources on somatic investment, like
maintenance and repair, and less on bearing children, which is consistent with the patterns of
the demographic transition. Our paper provides an alternative explanation for the transition
that explicitly accounts for the distinct yet crucial roles of diﬀerent dimensions of longevity for
economic and demographic development. Other than the quantity-quality approach of earlier
contributions where parents face a trade-oﬀ between the quantity and the quality of their oﬀ-
spring, we concentrate attention to the trade-oﬀ between resources devoted to child bearing
and the parents’ own education investment in terms of time devoted to diﬀerent types of hu-
man capital.8 Our contention is that the explicit consideration of the shift in the quantity and
quality of human capital can help to shed some light on the puzzling evidence cited above. In
that, the model is largely complementary to previously studied channels for the economic and
6Earlier contributions to the literature have concentrated on the existence of multiple steady state equilibria
and have explained the transition from a stagnant regime to an environment of sustained growth by scale eﬀects,
see Goodfriend and McDermott (1995), exogenous technological change, see Hansen and Prescott (2002), or
shocks, that move the dynamic system from one steady state to another, see Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and
Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2003).
7Other contributions studying the role of fertility for long-term development and the demographic transition,
include Kogel and Prskawetz (2001) (2001), Hazan and Berdugo (2002), Lucas (2002), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002),
and Lagerlof (2003), among others. See also the extensive survey by Galor (2005) for a detailed discussion of the
theoretical literature and empirical evidence regarding these issues.
8In this respect the trade-oﬀ considered here is fundamentally diﬀerent from the parental choice between
quantity and quality of children as studied by Barro and Becker (1988, 1989) , Galor and Weil (2000), and the
features of which have been discussed by Doepke (2005).
3demographic transition. However, the model does nor rely on subsistence consumption levels,
on precautionary demand for children or a diﬀerent rate of risk aversion with respect to con-
sumption and children. Another novelty is the explicit consideration of distinct dimensions of
longevity. A similar distinction was emphasized by Reis-Soares (2005). But while he studies
the response of fertility to exogenous changes in longevity and mortality, our focus is rather on
the study of the endogenous interactions between these diﬀerent domains in equilibrium, and
the endogenous economic and demographic transition. We limit attention to a deterministic
environment to highlight the role of the diﬀerent dimensions of health.9
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic framework, discusses the in-
dividual decision problem concerning education choice and fertility behavior, and derives the
equilibrium allocation within a given generation. Section 3 then introduces the dynamic interac-
tions between generations through life expectancy and technological progress. Section 3 derives
the dynamic equilibrium, as well as a characterization of the long-term development patterns
implied by the setup. In section 5, we provide an illustrative simulation of the model and brieﬂy
discuss the implications of the model in light of empirical and historical evidence. Section 6
concludes. For convenience, all proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 A Model of Human Capital and Fertility Choice with Health
2.1 The Framework
Individual Endowments and Timing. The timing of the model is illustrated in Figure 1.
Time is continuous, ¿ 2 R+. The economy is populated by an inﬁnite sequence of overlapping
generations of individuals, which are denoted with subscript t, where t 2 N+. As we want to
concentrate attention on the endogeneity of fertility choice and hence family size, for the moment
being we neglect any choices regarding the timing of fertility.10 A generation of individuals t,
born at some moment in time ¿t enjoys a childhood of length kt = k after which individuals turn
adult. Not all children of generation t survive childhood because of infant and child mortality.
The fraction of children surviving to adulthood is denoted by ¼t. At the beginning of their
life as adults (i.e. once a time k has passed from their birth) agents make decisions concerning
fertility and education. We assume that individuals reproduce as soon as they become adults.
Consequently, every generation is born kt = k periods after the birth of the respective previ-
ous generation.11 Reproduction is asexual and we abstract from issues of non-divisibility, i.e.
the number of children as a continuous choice variable, n 2 R+
0 .12 In order to highlight the
mechanism we restrict attention to a deterministic framework without sequential child birth.13
A generation of adults consists of a continuum of agents with population size Nt, which is de-
termined by size and fertility of the previous generation, as well as the survival probability of
children. Adults face a (deterministic) remaining life expectancy Tt speciﬁc to their generation
9We abstract from a precautionary motive for fertility. As discussed below, the results are complementary to
the ones by Kalemli-Ozcan (2002, 2003).
10See Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) for a paper on long-term development that deals with changes in the
timing of fertility.
11Instead of assuming a ﬁxed frequency of births, the length of the time spell between the births of two successive
generations, hence the timing of fertility, could be modelled as a function of the life expectancy of the previous
generation. This would modify the results concerning population size, but would leave the main results concerning
the economic and demographic transition unchanged.
12As investigated by Doepke (2005), accounting for the fact that in reality the number of children is discrete
can aﬀect the optimal choice if the parents have a precautionary demand for children. In the current framework
the assumption of n as a continuous variable is only made for simplicity.
13Uncertainty giving rise to precautionary motives in fertility behavior is realistic, but strictly complementary to
our analysis of fertility. Sequential fertility decisions would complicate the analysis without adding any additional
insights.
4t. The determinants of both child survival probability ¼t and adult longevity Tt are investigated
below.
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Figure 1: Timing of Events
At birth, every individual is endowed with ability a 2 [0;1], which is distributed uniformly
over the unit interval. Since child mortality aﬀects every child the same way, the ability distri-
bution of adults is also uniform.14
Individual Preferences. Adults care about their own consumption as well as about the





where ct is total lifetime consumption, nt is the total number of oﬀspring, ¼t 2 (0;1) denotes
the probability that a child survives childhood, and a parameter ° 2 (0;1). This formulation
reﬂects the trade-oﬀ between the resources devoted to own consumption and to raising children.
Individual utility is concave in consumption and the number of surviving oﬀspring. We abstract
from life cycle considerations, the choice of the optimal consumption and savings path over the
life cycle, discounting etc.15
Production of Human Capital. In order to make an income to consume, individuals have
to acquire human capital, which they can then supply on the labor market. Every generation
has to build up the stock of human capital from zero, since the peculiar characteristic of human
capital is that it is embodied in people. Human capital acquisition requires an education process
which requires foregoing some fraction of an individual’s available life time in education. In order
to isolate the development eﬀects related to the various dimensions of health and human capital
14The uniform distribution is for simplicity since the central results can be generated with any distribution of
ability f (a) among the surviving adults. The ex ante distribution of innate ability or intelligence does not change
over the course of generations. This issue is discussed below.
15The formulation also implies that individuals can perfectly smooth consumption as well as the utility from
children over their life. But at the same time, individuals cannot perfectly substitute utility from their own
consumption by utility derived from their oﬀspring.
5formation, any links between generations through savings or bequests are excluded.16
Agents can decide to acquire one of two types of human capital, which diﬀer in terms of
the education process they require, and the returns they generate. The ﬁrst type is interpreted
as high-quality human capital characterized by a high content of abstract knowledge. We refer
to this as skilled or theoretical human capital and denote it by h. The second type is labelled
unskilled, or practical human capital, denoted by l, and contains less intellectual quality, but
more manual and practical skills that are important in performing tasks related to existing
technologies.17 Education time, denoted by e and individual ability a are the only inputs of the
process of production of human capital. Nonetheless, as clariﬁed below, health facilitates the
acquisition of human capital. In particular the health status may aﬀect the amount of eﬀective
human capital which is acquired for any given time spent in education.
Both types of human capital are inherently diﬀerent with respect to the time intensity of their
acquisition, the eﬀectiveness of ability and the role of health in the education process. To acquire
h, it is necessary to ﬁrst spend time on the building blocks of the elementary concepts without
being productive in the narrow sense. Once the basic concepts are mastered, the remaining time
spent on education is more productive. This is captured by a ﬁx cost e measured in time units,
which an agent needs to pay when acquiring h. The characteristics of this education process are
formalized adopting the formulation,
h =
½
®(s)(e ¡ e)a if e ¸ e
0 if e < e
: (2)
In contrast, the time devoted to acquire l is immediately eﬀective, albeit with a lower overall
productivity, so there is no ﬁx time cost involved when acquiring l.18
l = ¯(s)e : (3)
A unit time of education produces ®(s)a units of h and ¯(s) units of l with ®(s) ¸ ¯(s). Health
aﬀects both the probability of oﬀspring surviving childhood and the adult longevity, i.e. the quan-
tity of time but it also aﬀects the quality of lifetime. This third dimension is considered by assum-
ing that a better health status increases the productivity education @®(s)=@s ¸ 0;@¯(s)=@s ¸ 0.
This formulation captures three crucial features of the human capital formation process:
Ability is relatively more important (and eﬀective) when acquiring advanced skills h; a larger
adult longevity T induces individuals to acquire more of any type of human capital and makes
skilled human capital relatively more attractive for individuals of any level of ability; and a
better health status s increases the eﬀectiveness of time spent in human capital acquisition,
particularly for advanced skills h. We adopt a linear speciﬁcation to disentangle the diﬀerent
eﬀects of health, longevity and ability in the subsequent analysis.19
2.2 Optimal Education and Fertility Decisions
We now turn to the choice problem of adult members of a given generation t. As is discussed
in more detail now, to maximize their utility, individuals optimally choose their education and
16We also abstract from real resources as input for the human capital formation process, as well as issues related
to capital market development and public provision of education.
17Hassler and Rodriguez-Mora (2000) use a related perception of abstract versus applied knowledge.
18A suﬃcient condition for the results below is that for applied human capital l the ﬁx cost in terms of time
is smaller, so for simplicity it is normalized to zero. We abstract from other costs of education, like tuition fees
etc. Moreover, the ﬁx cost is assumed to be constant and the same for every generation. Costs that increase or
decrease along the evolution of generations would leave the qualitative results of the paper unchanged.
19Any alternative model of human capital formation reproducing these features would be entirely equivalent
for the purpose of this paper. Alternative settings like learning on-the-job could similarly be used to illustrate
the importance of longevity and health for human capital formation.
6their fertility.20
The individual choice problem. Investments in human capital as well as in children imply
costs. In particular, while acquiring human capital, an individual cannot work and therefore
earns no income. With respect to fertility, parents face (time equivalent) cost both to give
birth and to raise children. We assume that the birth of each child entails a cost b so that
the total cost of births is given by bnt. While each birth is costly, not all children survive.
Bringing up the surviving children requires additional care in the sense of time spent with them,
inﬂicting opportunity costs in terms of foregone working time. We incorporate these additional
opportunity costs by assuming that the raising of surviving children implies an additional time
cost, so that the total cost of raising children is given by r(¼t)nt, where r(¢) is non-decreasing
in the child survival probability ¼t.
Denoting by w
j
t the wage rate paid at any moment in time to every unit of human capital of
type j = h;l acquired by generation t, the respective lifetime budget constraint of an individual
of generation t is then given by
ct + (bnt + r(¼t)nt)wl
tlt · (Tt ¡ et)wl
tlt (4)
in case of acquiring p human capital and
ct + (bnt + r(¼t)nt)wh
t ht · (Tt ¡ et)wh
t ht (5)
in the case of h human capital.21
The problem of an agent with ability a born in generation t is therefore, while taking as given
life expectancy Tt, child survival probability ¼t health status st and the wage w
j
t, to choose the
type of human capital j 2 fh;lg, the optimal education time spent on its accumulation, ej and
















subject to j 2 fh;lg , and conditions (4) and (5) : (7)





satisfying all constraints in (7). In order to characterize this vector, we ﬁrst characterize the op-
timal education and fertility choices for both types of human capital j = h;l, and then compare
the utility an agent derives from acquiring theoretical human capital h to that from acquiring
practical human capital l. The optimal choice j¤ is ﬁnally given by that type of human capi-
tal that oﬀers the highest lifetime utility given the optimal choices of education time and fertility.
Optimal education time and fertility for l-type human capital. The optimization
problem is strictly globally concave so that ﬁrst order conditions uniquely identify the optimal
choices made by any individual, conditional on the acquisition of any type of human capital.
Substituting the budget constraint, the optimal choices of education time and number of children














20We abstract from decisions about retirement and leisure.
21In general, one can think of the possibility that the costs for nourishing children and taking care of them
diﬀer between individuals that acquire theoretical human capital and individuals specializing in practical human
capital, but for simplicity we abstract from this possibility.
22Allowing individuals to acquire both types of human capital would not change the formal arguments, but
would imply a somewhat diﬀerent interpretation of human capital.
7The ﬁrst order conditions to this problem lead to the following expressions for the optimal
education time and fertility behavior,
el
t =









The optimal time investment in education decreases in the number of children, and in the
time invested in raising them. Likewise, the number of oﬀspring is lower the more time is
invested in education and the higher the cost for giving birth and raising them. Solving for the












Optimal education time and fertility for h-type human capital. Similarly an in-
dividual of ability a acquiring theoretical human capital chooses the education time and the
number of children optimally so that
feh¤
t ;nh¤





















The ﬁrst order conditions to this problem read
eh
t =








The inspection of these ﬁrst order condition makes clear that, again, ceteris paribus more children
decrease the time invested in own education. A higher ﬁx cost e involved with the acquisition
of theoretical human capital requires a larger time investment in education, however. Solving
the two equations for the expressions of the two optimal choices, one obtains
eh¤
t =









Optimal Choice of Human Capital Types. Summing up the previous results, larger
adult longevity facilitates both the acquisition of human capital and child rearing, regardless
of the type of human capital. This is the case since a longer working life relaxes the budget
constraint and allows to increase the number of children. This income eﬀect implies a positive
relationship between longevity and fertility. The second dimension of health, child mortality,
has an opposite eﬀect on fertility, however. A larger survival probability ¼t implies a larger
total cost of child raising and leads to a reduction in optimal fertility. This substitution eﬀect
implies that an improvement of health conditions in the form of lower child mortality implies a
reduction of fertility.
Still, from inspection of (8), (10), (11) and (13) it becomes apparent that, for any level of
Tt and ¼t the optimal education and fertility choices are diﬀerent depending on the type of
human capital acquired. In particular agents acquiring h type human capital invest more in





, an individual endowed with ability a and life expectancy Tt optimally chooses a
23This diﬀerential fertility behavior is well documented. See de la Croix and Doepke (2003) for a theoretical
investigation of the role of diﬀerential fertility in explaining the timing of the demographic transition.
8longer education period eh¤
t > el¤
t and a lower fertility nh¤
t < nl¤
t if he decides to acquire human
capital h as compared to human capital l.
The previous results illustrate the direct roles of the diﬀerent dimensions of health in aﬀecting
directly both education and fertility. In order to investigate the total eﬀect of Tt and ¼t, however,
we need to consider the optimal choice of the type of human capital acquired. This choice
depends, as shown below, on the level of wages which are determined in general equilibrium on
the labor markets and depend on the aggregate supply of both types of human capital.




t g we now turn attention to the
individual problem of choosing the type of education, l or h. Given the level of wages, this


















t from equations (10) and (13) to determine the optimal supplies of either type
of human capital in (3) and (2), respectively, one obtains the respective levels of human capital






t (Tt;a) = ®(s)
(1 ¡ °)
(2 ¡ °)
(Tt ¡ e)a : (15)























While the utility from low skilled human capital l on the left is independent of ability, the utility
from high skilled human capital h on the right is monotonically increasing in a. Agents with
higher ability therefore have a comparative advantage in the acquiring h, and the lifetime utility
for those investing in h increases monotonically in the ability parameter. For any individual of
ability a, there is a unique time investment and level of fertility which maximizes lifetime utility
from any type of human capital. The intra-generational allocation of time and ability resources
on the two types of human capital, and consequently also fertility behavior, is fully characterized
by a unique threshold ability that splits the population. For every vector of wage rates there is
only one level of ability e at for which the indirect utilities are equal. Due to the monotonicity
of uh¤
t in ability, all agents with a < e at optimally choose to acquire p, while those with ability




















In order to be able to determine the wages, and thus characterize the general equilibrium alloca-
tion within a given generation of individuals, we close the model by introducing the production
sector .
Aggregate Production and Wages. The unique consumption good is produced with
a production technology that uses the stocks of human capital of both types available in the
economy at any moment in time, i.e. embodied in all generations alive at that date, as the only
factors of production. The production technology is characterized by constant returns to scale,
9and diﬀerent intensities with which they use diﬀerent types of human capital.24 We adopt a
simple vintage model in which technologies are characterized by total factor productivity and
the shares of high skilled and low skilled human capital in production. For simplicity, vintages
are generation speciﬁc. This means that a given generation t can only operate the respective
vintage t.25 This allows us to concentrate attention to the production process during a given
generation when determining the labor market equilibrium. Total production of generation t is
given by a CES technology
Yt = At (xtL
´





with ´ 2 (0;1) and production shares xt = x(At) 2 (0;1) 8t where x0(At) < 0. Lt and Ht denote








Wage rates are determined in the macroeconomic competitive labor market and equal the


























We now solve for the equilibrium allocation of the economy for a given generation of adult
individuals. An intragenerational equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. [Intragenerational Equilibrium] An intragenerational equilibrium for gen-
eration t of adult individuals is a vector:
n












such that, for any given fTt;¼t;At;xtg, the individual choices of human capital investments and
fertility, (10) and (13), the implied optimal individual levels of human capital given by (15),
the corresponding population structure deﬁned by the threshold e at in condition (16), and the
resulting aggregate levels of human capital and wages in (19) are mutually consistent.
24The focus of the paper is not on the macroeconomic role of demand for diﬀerent consumption goods. The
role of diﬀerent income elasticities for diﬀerent goods for structural change from agriculture to industry has been
studied by Laitner (2000).
25Human capital is inherently heterogenous across generations, because individuals acquire it in an environment
characterized by the availability of diﬀerent vintages of technologies. Human capital acquired by agents of a
generation allows them to use technologies up to the latest available vintage. This implies that a generation’s
stock of human capital of either type is not a perfect substitute of that acquired by older or younger generations,
and is sold at its own price.
26Empirical evidence supports the view that diﬀerent sectors competed for labor, and wage payments reﬂected
productivity even at early stages of industrial development, see e.g. Magnac and Postel-Vinay (1997).
27Decreasing marginal productivity of human capital of any type and Inada conditions insure interior equilibria,
but they are not necessary to obtain the key results.
10The equilibrium threshold e at determines the fractions of the population of adults of a given
generation that acquire low and high skilled human capital. For notational convenience, we
denote these fractions in the following as
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f(a)da = e a¤
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t , there exists a unique ability threshold e at that splits the population such that
individuals with higher ability acquire human capital of type h, while individuals with lower
ability acquire p. Moreover, from condition (19) in the last section we know that the wage ratio is
determined by the relevant aggregate levels of human capital available in the economy for a given
generation that arise from the equilibrium allocation of adults to the two types of human capital.
Since for a given Tt the wage ratio is decreasing in the unique ability threshold, there exists a
unique intragenerational equilibrium that can be characterized as follows. Substituting for the
optimal human capital supplies and the resulting wages into condition (16), the intragenerational



















After some manipulations, one can solve for Tt as an implicit function of e a¤
t, the ability cut-oﬀ



























1¡´(1+°). The discussion so far
implies that the problem of determining the equilibrium vector is well deﬁned. An equilibrium
deﬁnes an implicit function in (e a¤
t;Tt) linking the equilibrium cut-oﬀ level of ability e a¤
t to lifetime
duration Tt, as in condition (21). Moreover, all variables characterizing the equilibrium human
capital formation of each generation are uniquely identiﬁed, since the implicit function relating
the cut oﬀ e a¤
t to life expectancy Tt is monotonically decreasing in Tt. Moreover, the relationship
exhibits (at most) one inﬂection point. We can therefore summarize our ﬁndings in the following
Proposition 1. [Intragenerational Equilibrium] For any generation t with Tt 2 [e;1);
the equilibrium fraction of individuals acquiring human capital, ¸t(T), is implicitly deﬁned by
(20) and satisﬁes Deﬁnition 1. This fraction is unique; is an increasing, S-shaped function
of expected lifetime duration Tt, with zero slope for T ¡! 0 and T ¡! 1, and exactly one
inﬂection point; is increasing in the level of technological development, A; and is bounded from
above by ¸t(A) < 1 with
@¸t(A)
@A > 0, limA!0 ¸t(A) = 0, limA!1 ¸t(A) = 1.
The S-shape relation between life expectancy T and the fraction of population acquiring
p, e a¤
t, is a ﬁrst central result, and generalizes the results presented in Cervellati and Sunde
(2005). The higher the life expectancy, the more people will invest in the time-consuming human
capital acquisition of h in equilibrium. However, this relation is stronger and more pronounced
for intermediate values of T and e a¤
t. For low levels of life expectancy, the share of population
investing in h is small due to the ﬁx cost involved with acquiring h, which prevents a large part
of the population to receive suﬃcient lifetime earnings to be worth the eﬀort. The larger the ﬁx
cost, the more pronounced is the concavity of the equilibrium locus. In this situation, it takes
suﬃciently large increases in life expectancy to incentivate a signiﬁcant fraction of individuals
11to switch from l-acquisition to h-acquisition. On the other hand, when the ability threshold is
very low, and a substantial share of the population is engaged in h, very large increases in T
are necessary to make even more individuals acquire h instead of l: Due to decreasing returns
in both sectors, the relative wage wh=wl is low when only few individuals decide to invest in
l. This dampens the attractiveness of investing in h for the individuals with low ability, even
though life expectancy is very high, rendering the equilibrium locus convex.
The equilibrium split of the generation into h- and l-skilled individuals, determines the
average fertility. In particular, the fertility behavior by h- and l-skilled individuals given by the
optimal individual decisions (10) and (13) implies an overall average gross fertility rate of
n¤
t(Tt) = (1 ¡ ¸t)nl¤
t + ¸tnh¤











Taking child mortality into account, the net fertility rate, and therefore the size of the next
generation of adults is given by n¤
t(Tt)¼t. The size of the adult generation t is therefore given
by Nt+1 = Nt(1 + nt¼t).28
As a result the health status aﬀects gross and net fertility in the population both directly, by
inducing a change in the optimal choice of education time and individual fertility, and indirectly
by inducing agents to acquire diﬀerent types of human capital. Concerning the role of longevity
these results are summarized in,
Proposition 2. [Effects of Adult Longevity] For any given ¼t, a longer adult longevity
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Adult longevity thus induces all individuals to spend more time on education. The partial
equilibrium eﬀect (income eﬀect) of adult longevity on fertility induces all agents to increase
the number of oﬀspring, taking child mortality as given. The general equilibrium additionally
implies a shift toward acquisition of h type human capital, which tends to reduce average fertility
through the diﬀerential fertility eﬀect. The ﬁrst term in condition (26) reﬂects the income eﬀect,
which is always positive and does not depend on Tt, while the second eﬀect reﬂects the diﬀerential
fertility eﬀect, which is always negative. The diﬀerential fertility eﬀect depends on Tt and is
28To allow for more realism, below we consider the possibility that not all surviving adults are able to reproduce
themselves, where this reproduction probability depends positively on the general health status s of the society.
Then Nt+1 = Nt(1 + nt¼t³(s)) with ³(s) 2 (0;1] and ³
0(s) > 0. In what follows, we simply assume that
³(s) = 1 8s.
12particularly strong for intermediate values of T because of the s-shape relationship between ¸
and T. If the latter eﬀect is suﬃciently small, in particular for small or large values of T (for
which @¸t=@Ltis small), the income eﬀect implies increasing gross fertility as longevity increases.
However, if the change in population structure is suﬃciently pronounced, i.e. the relationship
between ¸ and T is strong, average gross fertility actually declines if adult longevity increases.
Note that a similar result holds for net fertility rates, taking child survival ¼t as given.
Analogous results concerning the role of child mortality are summarized in
Proposition 3. [Effects of Child Survival Probability] For any Tt a larger survival
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t(Tt) ? 0 : (29)
Gross fertility of individuals, regardless of their education, is negatively related to child
survival rates. This is the substitution eﬀect, since children become more costly the more of
them survive until adulthood. Net fertility, on the other hand, may increase or decrease with
child survival probability. This eﬀect depends on whether the negative gross fertility eﬀect of an
increase in child survival, the ﬁrst term of condition (29), outweighs or not the positive eﬀect of
an increase in child survival on the number of surviving children, the second term of condition
(29). Technically, this condition is equivalent to
@(n¤
t¼t)
@¼t 7 0 , 1 7
¼tr0(¼t)
b+r(¼t). That is, if the costs
of raising children, r(¼t) increase strongly in child survival, then net fertility actually falls in ¼
when adult longevity T is high, i.e. the substitution eﬀect dominates.
This discussion concludes the analysis of the economy for a given generation t. We now turn
to the dynamics of the economy over the course of generations in order to investigate the mutual
interactions between the process of economic development, the acquisition of human capital and
the various dimensions of health.29
3 Dynamic Interactions
Each generation t of individuals takes adult longevity Tt, the survival probability of children ¼t
and the level of technological advancement, as expressed by At and x(At) as given. Before being
able to analyze the dynamics of the economy, we introduce the dynamics of these state variables
across generations.
Adult Longevity and Child Mortality. The theoretical analysis so far implies quite
distinct roles of diﬀerent dimension of life expectancy. In particular, while adult longevity is a
29For illustration purposes, we postpone the discussion of the dynamic evolution of the third dimension of health
s aﬀecting the eﬀectiveness of education for the acquisition of human capital, that is ®(s) and ¯ (s). While, as
seen below, adding this dimension of health provides additional insights, the main results to be discussed next
remain unchanged.
13key determinant for human capital acquisition, the probability that children survive until adult-
hood primarily aﬀects fertility behavior. The empirical evidence discussed in the introduction
also suggests somewhat diﬀerent determinants for these two distinct concepts of life expectancy.
Child survival seems primarily determined by the possibility to avoid diseases, that is the avail-
ability of adequate and suﬃcient nourishment and an environment that prevents or facilitates
infectious diseases. Adult longevity, in turn, appears to rather depend on the ability to cure
diseases, that is the level of medical knowledge, the availability of surgery and other medical
treatments that allow to repair physical damage and extend the aging process. Reis-Soares
(2005) reports evidence that suggests that adult longevity is barely aﬀected by improvements in
income or nutrition, but is rather related to ’structural’ factors that depend on the knowledge
available in a society. Ample empirical evidence suggests that better knowledge about diseases
and better technological conditions as well as public policies help to avoid or cure them, thereby
reducing mortality (see Mokyr, 1993, Schultz, 1993 and 1999, Easterlin, 1999). Empirical ﬁnd-
ings also suggest that income, wealth and particularly the level of education aﬀect mortality and
health, see Mirovsky and Ross (1998) and Smith (1999), and that a better educated society also
invents and adopts more and better drugs ( Lichtenberg, 1998, 2002, 2003). Taken together, the
evidence implies that the level of knowledge and the amount of human capital is relatively more
important for adult longevity than the level of development per se (reﬂected by, for example,
the level of per capita income). In light of this evidence, we make the extreme assumption that
adult life expectancy Tt increases in the amount of human capital embodied in a generation,
reﬂecting its level of knowledge.30 We formalize this positive externality by linking a generation
t’s life expectancy to the fraction of population the previous generation t ¡ 1 that acquired
human capital of type h:
Tt = Υ(e a¤
t¡1) = T + ½¸¤
t¡1 ; (30)
where ½ > 0 is a parameter describing the strength of the positive externality. This formulation
implies that the positive link and the dynamic process does not rely on scale eﬀects. Because of
the deﬁnition of e a¤ as a fraction, the lifetime duration is bounded from above and thus cannot
be increased beyond a certain level. We take this biological limit to extending life expectancy as
a commonly agreed empirical regularity (see also Vaupel, 1998). The minimum lifetime duration
without any human capital of type h is given by T. The functional form of this relation entails
no consequences for the main results, and a (potentially more intuitive) concave relationship
would not change the main argument.
The probability to survive childhood, in turn, is assumed to be a function of the level of
development at the time of birth of children only. This is in line with empirical ﬁndings that
suggest that higher incomes, public health expenditures, but also access to electricity or vaccines,
increases the probability of children to survive to adulthood, see e.g. Wang (2003) for a recent
survey. Capturing these ﬁndings, ¼ is modelled as a function of per capita income, implicitly
assuming that income is crucial in generating an environment that reduces child mortality. This







30Of course, in reality individuals can inﬂuence their life expectancy by a healthy life style, smoking habits,
drug and alcohol consumption, sports and ﬁtness behavior health care expenditures etc. Our model reﬂects the
view that individuals lacked a detailed knowledge about which factors and activities are healthy or detrimental
for average life duration during early phases of development. Moreover, beneﬁcial factors, such as leisure, were
simply not available. An explicit consideration of a positive correlation between life expectancy and the level of
education would reinforce the results.
14where Π0(¢) > 0.31 While a larger total income Yt¡1 in the population improves the probability
of children reaching adulthood, this formulation also implies a Malthusian element since a larger
population size Nt¡1 decreases living conditions and therefore child survival rates.32 Equiva-
lently for our results, life expectancy and child survival probability could be related to average
or total human capital or total income of the previous generation(s).33 If one accepts a positive
eﬀect of the level of human capital on aggregate income, our assumptions are also consistent
with evidence indicating that the aggregate income share spent on health care increases with
aggregate income levels.34 Note that improvements in adult longevity and child survival chances
involve no scale eﬀects.35
Technological Progress. The second dynamic element is the endogenous evolution of the
production technology. Technological improvements occur with the birth of a new generation of
individuals. Two features of the speciﬁcation of technological progress are crucial for our results.
First, human capital is the engine of growth through an externality working towards higher pro-
ductivity along the lines of Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990). New technological vintages are
characterized by larger TFP A. Secondly, human capital induces a non-neutral technological
process, as studied e.g. by Nelson and Phelps (1966), Acemoglu (1998), and Galor and Moav
(2000), among others. In particular, technological progress is biased towards high-skill intensive
production and depends on the stock of human capital already available in the economy. Em-
pirical evidence, provided e.g. by Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997) supports this feature. These
assumptions imply that the more individuals of a generation acquire skilled human capital the
more attractive is the accumulation of skilled human capital for future generations. Using a




= F (e a¤
t;At¡1) = ±Ht¡1(¸t¡1)At¡1 ; (32)
where ± > 0.36 In order to incorporate the feature of a skill biased technical change we assume
that the relative productivity of low-skilled human capital in production, x decreases with the
31In the illustrative simulations of the model presented below, we assume that




with yt¡1 = Yt¡1=Nt¡1, m > 0 and ¼ 2 (0;1) being the baseline survival in a non-developed society, in order to
ensure that ¼t is bounded between zero and one.
32Considerable evidence documents the negative eﬀect of population density and urbanization on child mortality,
especially during the ﬁrst stages of the demographic transition, see e.g. Galor (2005). The relevance of population
density and potential alternative, more explicit eﬀects of density for health and mortality are discussed in the
extensions below.
33See Tamura (2002) and Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2002), or Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) for
papers taking this approach.
34See Getzen (2000) and Gerdtham and J¨ onsson (2000) and the references there for respective evidence.
35The diﬀerential role of human capital and income per capita for child mortality and adult longevity has
potentially important dynamic implications as discussed below. While the extreme assumption is made for
simplicity, all results are unchanged as long as knowledge is relatively more important for adults longevity.
36While highlighting the role of human capital for technological progress, the speciﬁc functional form of this
relationship has little impact. Any speciﬁcation implying a positive correlation between technological progress
(At ¡At¡1)=At¡1 and Ht¡1 would yield qualitatively identical results. In the simulations below, we adopt Jones’











where ± > 0, Ã > 0, and Á > 0. As will become clearer below, assuming exogenous technical change would be
equivalent for the main results of the model. The only consequence of assuming exogenous advances would be a
missing reinforcing feedback eﬀect as the economy develops.
15level of technological advancement,




Note that there are no scale eﬀects involved in the speciﬁcation of technological progress. The
crucial relation is between the level of development and the fraction of the previous generation
of adults investing in skilled human capital.37
The process of development of the economy, and in particular the economic and demographic
transition, can be characterized as an interplay of individually rational behavior and macroeco-
nomic externalities, as we now show.
4 The Process of Economic Development
4.1 Steady State Equilibria
The global dynamics of the economy are fully described by the trajectories of the fractions of
the population acquiring either type of human capital, characterized by ¸ := (1 ¡ e a¤
t), adult
longevity, Tt, the probability of children surviving to adulthood, ¼t, the level of technological
development, At, and the respective production shares of human capital, xt. For notational
simplicity, in the following we denote e a¤ simply as a. The dynamic path is fully described by the
inﬁnite sequence fat;Tt;¼t;At;xtgt2[0;1), resulting from the evolution of the ﬁve dimensional,
nonlinear ﬁrst-order dynamic system derived from equations (21), (30), (31), (32) and (33):
8
> > > > <





xt = X (At) :
(34)
For illustrative purposes, we analyze the behavior of the economy by looking at the dynamic
adjustment of human capital and lifetime duration conditional on the value of relative produc-
tivity. Also note that the intra-generational equilibrium does not depend on the mortality of
children, ¼, as is illustrated by condition (21). We can therefore illustrate the dynamics of the
economy by ﬁrst considering the reduced conditional system:
½
¸t := (1 ¡ at) = Λ(Tt;A)
Tt = Υ(at¡1)
(35)
which delivers the dynamics of human capital formation and life expectancy for any given level
of technology A > 0. From the previous discussion we know that the ﬁrst equation of the
conditional system is deﬁned for T 2 [e;1).
Denote the S-shaped locus Tt = Λ(¸t;A) in the space fT;ag, which results from the intra-
generational equilibrium reﬂected by (21), by Λ(A;), and the locus Tt = Υ(at¡1) representing
the intergenerational externality on lifetime duration by Υ. Any steady state of the conditional
system is characterized by the intersection of the two loci Λ(A) and Υ:
Deﬁnition 2. [Steady State Equilibrium of the Conditional Dynamic System] A



































Figure 2: Phase Diagram of the Conditional Dynamic System
As a consequence of the s-shaped pattern of Λ, the system (35) displays at least one, and at
most three steady state equilibria Ez(A) denoted by z = S;u;G with diﬀerent properties. Figure
2 illustrates the system (35) in the case when three equilibria exist. Equilibria of type Eu(A)
are characterized by an intersection of the Υ-locus with the Λ-locus from below for intermediate
levels of ¸ and T. These equilibria are unstable, so in the following we only consider equilibria
of type S and G. The S-type equilibrium describes the situation of an economy in a nearly
stagnant environment. Adult life expectancy TS
A is low in such an equilibrium, and only a small
share ¸S
A of the population acquires human capital of type h. An equilibrium of type G, on
the other hand, is characterized by a large adult longevity TG
A and a large fraction ¸G
A of the
current adult population acquiring growth-enhancing human capital. Note that in any steady
state equilibrium, the supply of both types of human capital is strictly positive. The set of
equilibria Ez (A) ´ f¸z
A;Tz
Ag can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 4. [Properties of Steady State Equilibria] For any A 2 (0;1), a 2
(a(A);1), and T 2 (e;1), the conditional dynamic system (35) has steady state equilibria
with the following properties: (1) There exists least one steady state equilibrium; if it is unique,
it is globally stable; (2) there are at most three steady states denoted by ES (A), Eu (A), and









are locally stable; (iii) Eu
A is unstable; (iv) in any steady state equilibrium Hz
A > 0 and Lz
A > 0
for z = S;u;G.
We now turn to the analysis of the dynamic equilibrium of the economy.
4.2 The Economic Transition.
The analysis of the full dynamic system must account for the evolution of all variables of in-
terest. Human capital h helps in adopting new ideas and technologies, and thus creates higher
productivity gains than practical human capital p. This means that in the long run relative
productivity At will tend to increase.
Lemma 1. The technology index At increases monotonically over generations with limt¡!1 At =
+1.
The strict monotonicity of At over generations depends on the assumption that A is mono-
tonically increasing as generations pass. However, this assumption is not necessary for the main
argument. What is crucial is that productivity will eventually be increasing once a suﬃciently
37In the simulations below we adopt the simple formulation xt = A0=At:
17large fraction of the population acquires h. As At increases, the fraction of the population in-
vesting in h also increases. The levels of life expectancy necessary to make an agent of ability
a indiﬀerent between acquiring either types of human capital tend to decrease and the locus
HH (A) shifts down for any a (excluding the extremes):
Lemma 2. The life expectancy required for any given level of ability to be indiﬀerent between






< 0; 8 a 2 (0;1).
Thus, the more productive theoretical human capital h becomes relatively to applied human
capital p, the less restrictive is the ﬁx cost requirement of acquiring it, as the break-even of the
investment in education is attained at a lower age.
The two previous results imply that technological development is monotonous, and that
this monotonous development leads to continuous change in the allocation of ability and time
towards human capital acquisition. The following result combines these ﬁndings with the result
on the structure of steady state equilibria in the previous section.
Proposition 5. [Dynamic Emergence of Steady State Equilibria] Consider an economy
with e suﬃciently large, so that 8A · A0; the system (35) is characterized by a unique steady
state equilibrium of type S. There exist A0 < A1 < A2 < 1 such that the system (35) is
characterized by: (i) a unique type-S equilibrium 8At · A1; (ii) two steady states Eu(A1) and
ES(A1) at At = A1; (iii) three steady states: EG(At); Eu(At) and ES(At) 8At 2 (A1;A2); (iv)
two steady states EG(A2) and Eu(A2) at At = A2; (v) a unique G-type equilibrium 8At > A2.
With these results, we can characterize the development path of the economy by describ-
ing the unique dynamic equilibrium. Consider a non-developed economy in which adult life
expectancy is low.38 Since A is low, investing in h is relatively costly for a large part of the pop-
ulation as the importance of the ﬁx cost for education, e, is large. This means that the concave







, exhibiting low life expectancy and a small fraction of individuals
deciding to acquire theoretical human capital. This situation is depicted in Figure 3(a). During
this early stage of development, the feedback eﬀects on adult longevity and productivity are
very minor.
As generations pass, productivity growth makes investing in h more proﬁtable for everybody,
and adult life expectancy increases slowly. Graphically, the locus Λ(A) shifts downwards clock-
wise as time passes, and the importance of the concave part decreases. After a suﬃciently long
period of this early stage of sluggish development, Λ(A) exhibits a tangency point, and eventu-
ally three intersections with Υ. From this generation onwards, in addition to ES, also steady
states of type Eu and EG emerge. Since the S-type equilibria are locally stable, however, the
economy remains trapped in the area of attraction of the S-type equilibria, as depicted Figure
3(b).
As generations pass, the dynamic equilibrium induced by initially low adult life expectancy
moves along Υ. The consecutive downward shifts of Λ(A), however, eventually lead to a situa-
tion in which the initial dynamic equilibrium lies in the tangency of the two curves, as shown in
Figure 3(c). In the neighborhood of this tangency, the intragenerational equilibrium locus Λ(A)
lies below the linear Υ-locus and the equilibrium is not anymore stable. Already the following
generation faces an adult longevity that is high enough to induce a substantially larger fraction
38As will become clear below, starting from this point is without loss of generality. However, even though the
model is also capable of demonstrating the situation of developed economies, the main contribution lies in the














































Figure 3: The Process of Development
to acquire human capital h than in the previous generation. At this point a unique EG steady
state emerges, as is shown in Figure 3(d). This triggers a period of rapid development, dur-
ing which the fraction of population acquiring skilled human capital increases fast within few
consecutive generations, and adult life expectancy increases rapidly as consequence of the inter-
generational externality. This economic transition towards a path of permanent growth lasts for
a few consecutive generations. After this transition, life expectancy converges asymptotically
to its (biologically determined) upper bound ½ + T. Even though the fraction of the popula-
tion acquiring human capital h keeps growing, there is always some fraction of the population
acquiring applied knowledge l, but due to standard endogenous growth mechanisms, economic
development remains fast even though changes in adult longevity and human capital structure
in the economy abate.
The following proposition summarizes these global dynamics. The evolution of the sys-
tem is given by the sequence of ability thresholds, life expectancies and productivity levels
f¸t;Tt;Atgt2[0;1), starting in a situation of an undeveloped economy:
Proposition 6. [The Economic Transition] There exists a unique generation t2 such that
for all t · t2 the economy is characterized by a sequence of S¡type equilibria, while for all t > t2
the economy is characterized by a sequence of G¡type equilibria. This generation t2 is the ﬁrst
generation for which the level of technology exceeds A2 as given by Proposition 5.
It is important to note that the actual trajectory of the system depends on the initial
conditions and cannot be precisely identiﬁed in general. Proposition 6 in fact states that the
system moves generation by generation in the area of attraction of the locally stable steady state
19ES until this steady state disappears, and the system converges to a series of globally stable
steady states EG. In historical terms, the model therefore exempliﬁes the diﬀerent stages of
development. For example, Europe could be thought of as being trapped in a sequence of ES
equilibria during ancient times and the middle ages. At some point during the late 18th century
development took oﬀ, as the development trap endogenously vanished.
4.3 The Demographic Transition
After characterizing the economic development of the economy, we now turn to studying the
demographic development path in terms of fertility behavior and population dynamics, and the
diﬀerential roles of child and adult longevity in this process.
In the current framework, population dynamics are characterized by several opposing mech-
anisms. As child mortality decreases, i.e. the survival probabilities of children increase, adults
of either type of education optimally decide to have fewer oﬀspring. This substitution eﬀect
arises since adults care about the total number of surviving children. In the current framework,
there is no uncertainty that would require the hoarding of children and, as discussed above, if
only this eﬀect is at work no net fertility drop can be observed in the population following a
reduction in child mortality. However, improvements in health conditions also have other ef-
fects. Consider again the individually optimal fertility decisions that are implied by the choice
to acquire human capital of type l or h, conditions (10) and (13), respectively. All individuals
increase their fertility as their adult life expectancy increases, regardless of which type of human
capital they decide to acquire. This increase arises due to a standard income eﬀect. The joint
consideration of these two eﬀects implies that, conditional on education choices, net fertility
increases after improvements in living conditions. A third eﬀect arises due to the shift toward
the acquisition of h human capital. Conditional on facing the same adult longevity Tt and child
survival probability ¼t, adults who decide to become high-skilled optimally choose to have fewer
children than adults who acquire human capital of type l. This diﬀerential fertility eﬀect linked
to the structural change, gains importance along the development path, since, as has been shown
before, eventually the population structure shifts from acquisition of l-type human capital to
the acquisition of h¡type human capital as the economic transition takes oﬀ. As a result nearly
the entire population eventually acquires skilled human capital which is associated to longer
education and lower fertility. The joint consideration of three eﬀects implies a non monotonic
evolution of fertility and education and can rationalize the drop in net fertility rates after an
initial increase in both gross and net fertility.
To characterize the overall fertility pattern, consider the two extremes of the development
process described before. At the beginning of the development process, steady state equilibria are
characterized by low adult longevity, high child mortality, and very few adults acquiring skilled
human capital h. The alternative scenario is given by the conditions in developed economies
with adult longevity approaching the biological upper limit, marginal child mortality and almost
all adults acquiring h-type human capital. Denote total fertility in the population in the former
scenario of a steady state ES where virtually the entire population acquires l-type human capital,
¸0 ¼ 0, as n0. Total fertility under these conditions approximately corresponds to the fertility
given by condition (10). In contrast, under the second scenario ¸1 ¼ 1, such that total fertility
is approximately given by condition (13). The resulting total fertility is denoted by n1, and the








In terms of net fertility rates the condition for a drop in net fertility from the beginning until







= n1 : (37)
Since this paper is concerned with showing how the process of development can generate
a fall in net fertility, in the following we restrict attention to speciﬁcations that in principle
allow for such episodes, assuming that condition (37) is satisﬁed. As discussed above, a decline
in net fertility can be observed in the model even in the absence of precautionary demand
for children if the reduction in fertility associated with the switch from l to h type human
capital acquisition is large enough. We can make this notion more precise. Note ﬁrst that as a
consequence of its deﬁnition and the fact that child survival increases monotonically along the
development path, average net fertility nt¼t can only decline if average gross fertility nt declines.
For gross fertility to decline, the scope for increases in adult longevity must be limited, the ﬁx
time cost for education attainment must be suﬃciently high, and the potential to increase in
child survival probability, together with the associated increase in the time cost implied with
bringing up surviving children, must be suﬃciently high. These conditions are closely in line
with historical data. For example, child mortality in England and Wales fell substantially from
around 20 percent in the period 1550-1600 to less than 0.5 percent at the end of the 20th
century. Adult longevity measured by life expectancy at the age of 30 experienced an increase
from around 60 years to around 75 years.39 Considering that the acquisition of higher education
is currently associated to a time investment, e; from 10 to 15 years this can help rationalize the
reduction in fertility.40 Hence, the model shows that the dramatic and fast changes in human
capital acquisition that accompanied the demographic transition can rationalize and explain the
substantial decline in gross fertility and the fact that net fertility eventually decreases. These
observations are recorded in the following,
Proposition 7. [Gross and Net Fertility in the Process of Development] (i) Gross
fertility eventually declines if the positive income eﬀect from improvements in T is outweighed
by the negative substitution eﬀect from increases in ¼, and the negative diﬀerential fertility eﬀect
from increases in ¸, i.e. if n0 > n1 in condition (36). (ii) Net fertility eventually declines if
the negative diﬀerential fertility and substitution eﬀects, and the consequential decrease in gross
fertility is suﬃciently pronounced compared to the increase in child survival probability, i.e. if
n0¼0 > n1¼1 in condition (37).
The current framework therefore oﬀers an explanation that can generate the observed drop in
gross and net fertility, which is based on diﬀerential fertility choices depending on the education
choice. Only in combination with the economic transition can a demographic transition arise,
however, indicating the close interrelationship between economic and demographic development.
In fact, as will become clearer below, the present framework constitutes a uniﬁed model which
allows to investigate the endogenous transition from an equilibrium with low adult longevity,
high child mortality and high fertility towards an equilibrium with high adult life expectancy,
low child mortality and low fertility.41
After these quasi-static considerations using limit results, let us now turn to the full dy-
namic characterization of the demographic transition. The typical pattern of the demographic
39Data are from Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981) and UK national statistics.
40In the following section we discuss the relevant data with particular attention to the historical experience of
England.
41In fact the present framework provides a uniﬁed theory which disentangles the role of changes in adult
longevity and child mortality. This paper complements the quantity-quality framework used in earlier uniﬁed
theories, including the seminal work by Galor and Weil (2000).
21transition considered in the literature is the following. Development begins with an extended
phase characterized by low living standards and low adult longevity, high child mortality and
large fertility. The economic and demographic environment barely changes with technological
progress being ‘glacial’ in the words of Galor and Weil (2000). Any increases in longevity (or
income for that matter) directly funnel into higher levels of fertility. Eventually, when the
economic development picks up momentum, more people become skilled, productivity growth
accelerates and living standards improve. In this second phase of development, dubbed the
‘Post-Malthusian Regime’ by Galor and Weil (2000), adult longevity already increases, child
mortality is still high, and fertility increases as incomes grow. Eventually, as child mortality
falls and long adult longevity induces large fractions of the population to become skilled, also
fertility starts declining, and the economy enters a modern growth path on which income grows
while fertility declines to low levels.
From the previous discussion it appears reasonable to assume that condition (37) is satisﬁed,
which we do in the following.42 Then, recalling the results about the economic transition in
Proposition 6 one can characterize the pattern of demographic development as follows:
Proposition 8. [The Demographic Transition] The path of demographic development ex-
hibits three phases: (i) an extended phase with low child survival and adult longevity, ¼ and T,
and high average fertility n (Malthusian equilibrium); this phase lasts until generation t2; (ii)
an intermediate phase with increasing child survival rates and adult longevity, together with an
even higher gross fertility rate (post-Malthusian equilibrium); (iii) a phase of increasing child
survival rates and adult longevity, together with a low gross and net fertility rates (modern growth
equilibrium).
Consider the dynamics of the economy as depicted in Figure 3. During the early phase of
development, when the economy is dynamically trapped in the area of attraction of an ES-type
steady state, society is characterized by low levels of adult longevity, and very few adults in
the population decide to become skilled. At the same time, living standards are low, and child
mortality is high. The economic and demographic environment that is barely changing with
technological progress. Any gains in longevity (or income for that matter) directly increase
fertility. Larger populations, however, reduce per capita income, which, according to (31) in-
creases child mortality. Thus, the early phase of development exhibits Malthusian features.43
This situation reﬂects the ﬁrst phase of demographic development as stated in the proposition.
As has been shown before, eventually an economic transition is triggered once adult longevity
and the technological level provides incentives for a suﬃciently large fraction of the population
to acquire skilled human capital h. On the one hand, this increases adult longevity of subsequent
generations due to the intergenerational externality (30). As a consequence of the income eﬀect
described before, this leads to increased fertility. Simultaneously, the aforementioned diﬀerential
fertility and substitution eﬀects tend to dampen fertility, as the education structure changes
towards higher levels of ¸, and as income gains associated with larger productivity reduce child
mortality due to the external eﬀects implied by (32) and (31), respectively. Which of the
eﬀects prevails depends on their relative strength as well as the timing of the delays involved in
the intergenerational transmission mechanisms. Dynamically, the fertility reducing eﬀects are
likely to be minor at the onset of the economic transition and to be dominated by the income
eﬀect. In this case, the model predicts an increase in gross and net fertility during the early
stages of the economic transition. This is reﬂected by phase (ii) of demographic development
42It should be noted, however, that qualitatively similar results arise even if (37) does not hold, as will become
clear below.
43Note that as a result of the intergenerational feedback eﬀects, and the fact that technology growth is incre-
mental, the economy never actually experiences stagnation in the strict sense since there are always improvements
although they are negligible. We therefore refrain from calling the early phase a Malthusian regime of stagnancy.
22in Proposition 8, and consistent with the second phase of development, dubbed the ‘Post-
Malthusian Regime’ by Galor and Weil (2000). Note, however, that this transitional phase can
be very short when convergence to the EG-steady state is rapid. If the change in human capital
structure is suﬃciently swift over the course of a few generations, implying a strong diﬀerential
fertility eﬀect, or likewise if the substitution eﬀect is strong since child survival rates improve
strongly with little delay to the economic transition, the Post-Malthusian phase (ii) might be
short as society quickly enter phase (iii) when the two fertility-reducing eﬀects of increasing child
survival rates and larger importance of diﬀerential fertility from investments in h¡type human
capital gain momentum. Thus, under condition (37) gross and net fertility eventually start
declining despite adult longevity and per capita income still growing. The economy therefore
enters a ‘Modern Growth Regime’, once more following the classiﬁcation of Galor and Weil
(2000).44
The joint consideration of diﬀerent dimensions of health and the diﬀerent timing of improve-
ments in these dimensions may help to reconcile the empirical and historical observations with
a uniﬁed theory based on endogenous life expectancy. Several authors pointed out problems
of the existing theoretical literature aiming to explain the demographic transition and the eco-
nomic take oﬀ with changes in life expectancy as the key state variable. As discussed before, the
observation of a reduction in net fertility has proven diﬃcult to rationalize in previous models.
The joint consideration of income, substitution and diﬀerential fertility eﬀects associated with
human capital formation provides a framework that allows to generate a decline in fertility in a
model with life expectancy as key state variable.
This completes the discussion of the theoretical results. Before presenting simulations of the
model that illustrate the working of the model, we brieﬂy discuss the eﬀects when explicitly
taking general health status into account.
4.4 The Role of Overall Health for Development
We can now come back to the role of health in terms of the quality of the lifetime available to
individuals. As was argued in the beginning, one could think of health not only in terms of child
survival probabilities or adult longevity, but also in terms of overall health status and the quality
of life. A good health status allows to acquire human capital more eﬃciently, i.e. in less time,
and also implies higher productivity than a bad health status with recurrent illness, as indicated
by s in (2) and (3), with ®0(s) ¸ 0;¯0(s) ¸ 0. Hence, changes in the overall health status unfold a
diﬀerential eﬀect on the productivity to acquire unskilled and skilled human capital.45 The eﬀect
of s is diﬀerent from both longevity and child mortality. Concerning the process of development
larger longevity Tt induces an increases on both fertility and education (the income eﬀect) but
also induces a shift toward the acquisition of human capital. Child mortality, in turn, aﬀects
fertility via a substitution eﬀect. The key ramiﬁcation of taking health status s into account
becomes obvious when considering the implicit condition for an intra-generational equilibrium
(20). The larger the ration ®(s)=¯ (s) the larger the fraction of the population which optimally
decides to acquire human capital h:46 This implies that the health status s has a direct impact
44Consider the dynamic pattern when condition (37) fails to hold. Even under this scenario, the observed
fertility rates experience a marked slow-down due to the transition to a low-fertility high-education equilibrium
allocation of large parts of the population, reﬂected by a E
G steady state.
45Available evidence documents how better health increases school attendance, see e.g. Alderman et al. (2001),
Bleakley (2003), and Miguel and Kremer (2004).
46Concerning the intra-generational equilibrium health and technology are iso-morphic. The role played by
health a similar role as productivity A, reﬂected by the production share of skilled human capital, 1 ¡ x(A).
Improvements in the overall health status have a similar eﬀect on the intra-generational equilibrium locus as do
productivity improvements.
23on both fertility and human capital via the diﬀerential fertility eﬀect. In particular we have,
Proposition 9. [Effects of Changes in Overall Health] For any fTt;¼t;Atg improve-
ments in health s implies:
















The eﬀect of the health status depends on its impact on the relative productivity of the
time invested in h education relative to the l: If the productivity of the education process is
increasing more for h skilled human capital then health improvements facilitate the acquisition
of h and accelerates the economic transition.47 Dynamically, the eﬀect of health implies a faster
or slower transition process and crucially aﬀects the strength of the diﬀerential fertility eﬀect.
The overall health condition depends on several factors. Just as adult longevity, it is con-
ceivable that health primarily depends on the possibility to treat and cure diseases, i.e. the state
of medical knowledge that is reﬂected by the share of population of high skilled individuals in
the past generation. On the other hand, health status may depend negatively on population
density, which facilitates the spreading of infectious disease, so






< 0 : (40)
In this setting, health improvements work towards accelerating the escape from the development
trap if
@ [®(s)=¯ (s)]=@s > 0 implied by an equilibrium in the area of attraction of an ES steady state.
If population density negatively aﬀects health, however, this slows down the process of health
improvement, adding another Malthusian feature to the model.
The main goal of this paper is to provide a ﬁrst attempt to disentangle the diﬀerent role of
these diﬀerent dimensions of health for the economic and the demographic transition. Depend-
ing on the assumptions one makes about the dynamics of overall health, the model generates
development patterns which, despite being qualitatively similar, may diﬀer with respect to the
duration of the diﬀerent phases. If health is modelled as incremental process, reﬂecting the
idea that medical knowledge does build up as generations pass and record their experiences,
it can substitute technological improvements as the engine behind the secular transition in the
economy. In fact, as simulations of the model for this case show, an economic and demographic
transition can arise entirely without technological improvements, just as a result of gradually
improving health conditions.
5 Discussion
In this section we provide a brief discussion of the results in light of historical evidence, and
then present an illustrative simulation of our model.
47Notice that the eﬀect of health on ®(s)=¯ (s) may depend on s itself being negative for initial improvements
(i.e. more favorable to low-skilled human capital l) and positive once s is large enough.
245.1 The Economic and Demographic Transition: Stylized Facts
At the time when the economic transition took oﬀ in the late 18th century, mortality fell sig-
niﬁcantly and average life expectancy at birth as well as at later ages, which had virtually been
unchanged for millennia, increased sharply within just a few generations.48 The improved en-
vironment and living conditions associated with better health conditions, lower mortality and
overall life expectancy, as well as changing economic demands triggered a more widespread ac-
quisition of human capital. Interestingly, improvements in life expectancy at birth lags adult
longevity in terms of life expectancy at age 30. This is an indication that infant mortality began
to fall much later than mortality at later ages. Basic education and human capital indicators like
average literacy rates, and years spent in formal schooling and year of apprenticeships improved
substantially after the take oﬀ.49 Also, along the process of development, fertility increased from
high levels, before reproduction rates fell substantially. Nevertheless, population size increased,
mostly due to increased life expectancy. The development in these dimensions is illustrated in
Figure 4. 50
The empirical and historical evidence suggests that the acquisition of human capital by part
of parents and the increase in the lifetime devoted to education represents an ﬁrst order determi-
nant of fertility behavior.51 Simultaneously, or slightly delayed compared to the improvements
in health and life expectancy, fertility behavior changed substantially. Fertility rates dropped
from high levels in less developed countries to substantially in the context of economic develop-
ment and improvements in living conditions. This demographic transition typically lags health
improvements somewhat, as during the second half of the 19th century, see Galor and Weil
(2000), and as in developing countries today. Due to health improvements and despite fertility
reductions, the size of population started to increase substantially in European countries. The
increase in population size even after the decrease of fertility suggests that the reduction in re-
production is more than compensated by an increase in lifetime duration. Apart from changing
overtime, both education and fertility choices diﬀer substantially across the population, however.
A large evidence documents that education choices depend on individual living conditions, in
particular economic environment, health and life expectancy. Individual fertility decisions in
turn depend on individual income and education.52
The majority of developed countries also exhibits a timing of the events in the diﬀerent
dimensions of the economic and demographic transition that is in line with the predictions of
Proposition 8. In particular, improvements in adult longevity seem to have aﬀected fertility as
well as economic growth in a causal sense as has recently been documented by Lorentzen, McMil-
lan, and Wacziarg (2005). Similarly, Reis-Soares (2005) reports that gains in adult longevity
preceded the decline in net fertility. Several authors have pointed out, however, that in some
historical experiences the timing of the transition is not compatible with the available theories
linking mortality and fertility. Doepke (2005) and Galor (2005) cite evidence that the fertility
decline started well before the onset of the substantial drop in child mortality in England. At
the same time, the changes in fertility display a substantial time lag with respect to the in-
creases in adult longevity at the onset of the Industrial Revolution.53 While these empirical
48This is illustrated by the data provided by Floud and McCloskey (1994).
49Extensive evidence on this is reported by Cipolla (1969) and Floud and McCloskey (1994).
50Data are from the quoted sources. Life expectancy and fertility data are taken from Wrigley
and Schoﬁeld (1981), Keyﬁtz and Flieger (1968) and the websites of the Oﬃce of National Statistics
(http://www.statistics.gov.uk) and the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Af-
fairs of the United Nations Secretariat (World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization
Prospects: The 2003 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp). Missing values are obtained by linear intrapolation.
51This is true, a fortiory, once considering the increased education of work participation by women.
52de la Croix and Doepke (2003) provide theoretical and empirical arguments for which diﬀerential fertility
aﬀects the occurrence and the timing of the transition.
53See also the evidence provided by Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2003).
25Table 1: Parameter Values Used for Simulation
® 0.95 ¯ 0.05 ½ 25.0 ¼ 0.75
° 0.5 ´ 0.4 e 15.0 e a(0) 0.995
Ã 0.42 Á 1.25 T 50.0 A(0) 0.75
¹ 2 º 6 r 1.5 b 1
ﬁnding are seemingly puzzling in the current theoretical literature they can be rationalized by
considering the diﬀerent dimensions of adults and child mortality and the possibility that im-
provements in these diﬀerent domains where not always contemporaneous. Historically, one can
argue that health, adult longevity and child mortality were aﬀected diﬀerently by the process
of development. Consider again Proposition 8. The duration and extent of the post-malthusian
phase crucially depends on the relative strength and timing of the diﬀerent eﬀects at work. How
could one generate a demographic transition with adult longevity improving well before child
mortality declines?54 A delay in the decline of child mortality implies that after the start of
the transition the income eﬀect is relatively stronger than the substitution eﬀect. Under these
conditions it is likely that gross fertility initially increases, and only declines with a lag once
the diﬀerential fertility eﬀect associated to the sharp changes in acquisition of human capital
becomes suﬃciently strong. This can be the case even if the substitution eﬀect is not too strong
since child mortality is still large. In the next section we discuss this issue in more detail and
show that a decline in gross fertility can be observed even before the large improvement in child
mortality (and accordingly of life expectancy at birth).
5.2 An Illustrative Simulation of the Development Path
We simulate the model for 600 generations, with new generations born at a frequency of one
year.55 The parametric speciﬁcations used for the intergenerational externalities are given in
the text for T in equation (30), for ¼ in footnote 31, for A in footnote 36, and for x in footnote
37, respectively. Parameter values and initial conditions used in the simulation are contained in
Table 1. The time costs of surviving children is parameterized as function r(¼t) = r ¢ ¼º
t
Marginal productivity of time spent in education, given a speciﬁc level of ability, is assumed
to be the same in the production of both types of human capital. A maximal life expectancy
of 75 years cannot be exceeded, while the minimum adult longevity is assumed to be 60 years.
Initial child survival probability is 0.8. All these numbers are roughly in line with historical
data from England, where life expectancy at age 30 was around 60 in the 16th century, and
mortality of infants between age 0 and 9 was around 220/1000. The ﬁx cost of acquiring
theoretical human capital h, e, is 15 years. Initially, the share of production accruing to L,
x = 0:95. Clearly, the model is capable of producing a deliberately long stagnancy period before
the transition. The main patterns of development generated by the model are depicted in Figure
5. The patterns resemble closely those in the historical data presented before and illustrate the
discussion of the main results in section 4. Figure 6 makes clear that the model is capable of
generating complex fertility dynamics. In particular, during the demographic transition, fertility
54In fact there are several reasons why this could have been the case in the ﬁrst experiences of demographic
transition including the increase in population density and urbanization and the fact that living conditions (and per
capita income) improved several decades after the increase in acquisition human capital and medical knowledge.
55Interpreting every year as the arrival of a new generation, this reﬂects a horizon from year 1500 to 2100,
which includes the period of economic and demographic transition.
26intermediately increases due to income eﬀects. Eventually, fertility declines in the later stages
of the demographic transition. However, net fertility peaks well after gross fertility has started
to decline. This can be explained by the diﬀerential timing of the improvements in the diﬀerent
dimensions of health, i.e. adult longevity and child mortality.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a uniﬁed growth theory that disentangles the role of diﬀerent dimensions
of health for economic development. In particular, the framework distinguishes between the
expected length of adult life, which constitutes the primary determinant for education decisions;
the probability that children survive childhood, which crucially aﬀects fertility decisions; and
overall health status, which determines the overall capability to acquire human capital, and
therefore productivity. Taking the diﬀerent dimensions into account, agents choose optimally
which type of human capital to acquire and the lifetime devoted to its acquisition. At the same
time, they decide optimally about their fertility and the implicit time cost involved with bringing
up children. Optimal choices of time investments in education and fertility behavior depend on
the level of development and which education path is chosen. Agents choosing diﬀerent education
proﬁles exhibit diﬀerent fertility behavior and spend a diﬀerent amount of time in child rearing.
The dynamic equilibrium of the model exhibits patterns that are in line with historical ev-
idence and stylized facts. In particular, the model can rationalize long periods of stagnancy
followed by the simultaneous acceleration of income and productivity growth together with
improved health conditions, and spreading education levels. The framework presented here gen-
erates a demographic transition, which is linked closely to the economic transition from a nearly
stagnant to a fast growing environment. Unlike previous models, the separate consideration
of diﬀerent dimensions of health allows to generate a demographic development pattern that
accounts for declines in net fertility rates. Moreover, it provides a rationale for the seemingly
inconsistent timing of fertility, child mortality and adult longevity that has been observed in
the data and proved diﬃcult to rationalize in a model in which life expectancy is the crucial
determinant of the economic transition. While the model is solved analytically, simulations of
the model illustrate the diﬀerent mechanisms at work.
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Figure 4: The Stylized Facts of Long-Run Development
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Figure 5: A Simulation of the Development Process
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33A Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition 1 in Cervellati and Sunde (2005).









i2 < 0 ; (41)
since g0(a) < 0, 8a 2 [0;1]. The variable a denotes a lower bound on the ability threshold in the
sense that even in the absence of biological constraints, i.e. when Tt = T + ½, the equilibrium
ability cut-oﬀ cannot be lower. Therefore, we conclude that for a given set of parameters
° 2 (0;1), A = AH
AP , for every a 2 [a;1] there is one and only one T > 0 such that (21) is
satisﬁed.
We next show that the lower bound on the ability threshold, a is decreasing in Ωt. The claim
follows from the deﬁnition of e a¤ (Ω), and the fact that g(e a¤) is strictly decreasing in e a¤.
The intuition of the following proof proceeds as follows: We solve equilibrium condition
(20) for T as a function of e a¤ and investigate the behavior of this function. Due to the fact
that T(e a¤) is strictly monotonically decreasing within the admissible support the function is
invertible within this range of support. We then show that there exists one and only one e a¤
for which the second derivative of this function equals zero. Since the condition for the second
derivative to equal zero cannot readily be solved for e a¤, we decompose it into two components
and show that one is strictly monotonically increasing within the support while the other is
strictly monotonically decreasing, such that there must exist one and only one e a¤ for which the
condition is satisﬁed by the intermediate value theorem. But if T(a) has a single inﬂection point
and is invertible, also a(T) has a single inﬂection point and is therefore S-shaped.




























Due to the fact that T0(a) < 0 8a 2 [a;1], we note that the function T(a) is invertible in the
range a 2 [a;1] of the support. Note also that T(a) ¸ T 8a 2 [0;1], so the inverse function a(T)
is strictly monotonically decreasing for all positive T. The proof follows substituting a2 with
b and to re-write g(a) ´ h(b), g0(a) ´ h0(b), and g00(a) ´ h00(b), where b = (a)
2. Thus deﬁne
T(a) = T (b), so the derivatives T0(a) = T 0(b) and T00(a) = T 00(b) can be re-written in terms of
b. Taking






Existence of an inﬂection point can already be inferred from a closer examination. Since
h0(b) < 0 8b 2 [b;1]
we know that also T 0(b) < 0 8b 2 [b;1]. Moreover, one immediately sees that limb!1 h0(b) =
¡1 , lima!1 T0(a) = ¡1, such that T has inﬁnitely negative slope at both boundaries of the
34admissible support, suggesting that there must exist at least one inﬂection point. From these
arguments it is also clear that the slope of the inverse function, a0(T), converges to zero at both
boundaries of the support. Analysis of the second derivative T 00(b) allows to show existence and
uniqueness of an inﬂection point.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The claims (1) and (2) follow from taking partial derivatives of the respective expressions
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Proof of Proposition 3:
The claims (1) and (2) follow from taking partial derivatives of the respective expressions
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Proof of Proposition 4:
Note: As long as there is no danger of confusion, we suppress the subscripts ’t’ for generation
t for notational convenience (e.g. Tt(at) = T(a), etc.).
(i): Existence of a dynamic equilibrium for the conditional system. Recall that the locus
TT is linear with slope ¡½ and values T(a = 0) = T + ½ and T(a = 1) = T. From the proof of
Proposition 1 we know that, for any A > 0, the locus HH (A) is such that lima#a(A) Tt(a;A) = 1,
and that its value is monotonically decreasing 8a > a(A). Hence, if the value of this non-linear
relation at a = 1 is smaller than that of the linear relation of the intergenerational externality,
there must exist at least one intersection by the intermediate value theorem. However, note that
T(1) = e 8t, and that by assumption e < T. That means the ﬁx cost for theoretical education is
always lower than any minimum life expectancy, otherwise theoretical education would never be
an alternative, not even for the most able individual in the world. Hence a dynamic equilibrium
exists for every generation t.
(ii): From the proof of (i) and noting that any steady state is characterized by an interior
solution with a < 1, since T(a = 1) = T > e, which in turn implies that Ht > 0 and Pt > 0 for
any t > 0.
(iii): The claims follow from Proposition 1 : We know that HH (A) has always a unique
turning point and takes values above and below TT at the extremes a(A) and 1. Hence the
two curves can intersect at most three times, while they intersect at least once by (i). Claim
35(a) follows from the negative slopes of both loci that allow to rank steady states. Claims (b)
and (c) are true since, in the extreme equilibria EG and ES, HH (A) intersects TT from above,
which means that the system is locally stable, while the opposite happens in the intermediate
equilibrium Eu, since HH (A) must cut TT from below. Thus Eu is locally unstable. Claim (d)
follows from the fact that if only one steady state exists it must be stable since HH (A) starts
above TT and ends below so it must cut from above. The concavity/convexity of HH (A) in the
stable equilibria is used to identify them since in case of multiplicity one must be in the concave
and the other in the convex part.
Proof of Lemma 1.
By assumption, ± > 0, Á > 0, and Â > 0 in equation (32), such that ˙ AH:t > 0, and AH:t >
AH:t¡1 8t. At¡1 and At are linked in an autoregressive way, and equation (32) as suggested in




:t¡1 + 1 > 1
for any t, since from the previous proposition Ht > 0 for any t and ± > 0: This means that the





















The claim follows by partial derivation of equation (44), @
@ΩtTt(at) = ¡
g(at)e
(Ωt¡g(at))2 < 0 8at 2
[at;1].
Proof of Proposition 5:
Consider Equation (44), and denote the function characterizing the slope of the HH(A) locus
for any a by HH0(A) ´
@T(a;A)
@a . Similarly, let HH00(A) ´
@2T(a;A)
@a2 denote the second derivative
of the HH(A) locus for any a. From Proposition 1, we know that HH0(A) is U-shaped. It takes
inﬁnite value at the extremes of the support fa(A);1g, and exhibits a unique global minimum
corresponding to the inﬂection point of HH (At). In the following, we denote aI
A as the level of
a corresponding to the global minimum of the function HH0(A) (or, equivalently corresponding
to the unique inﬂection point of the function HH(A)), characterized by HH00(A;aI
A) = 0. A
useful intermediate result describes the eﬀect of A on the slope of the HH-locus:
Lemma 3. For any a 2 [a(A);1], HH0(A) decreases as A increases.
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+1; 8a 2 [a(A);1] and limA¡!0 a(A0) = 1; therefore HH0(A) eventually take zero value in the
interior of the bounded support as A ¡! 1; and HH(A) is basically a vertical line at a = 1
(with inﬁnite slope) as A ¡! 0.
Since HH0(A) shifts downwards monotonically as A increases, there exists a unique value
A0, and by Lemma 1 also a unique t0, such that HH0(A0;aI
A0) = ½. For this level of A = A0,
HH0 and TT0 are tangent. Hence, HH0(A;aI
A)
>
< ½ () A
<
> A0. Since HH0(A) is globally
convex, and by deﬁnition of aI
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  Figure A1: Emergence of Multiple Equilibria 
 
Figure 7: Slope of the HH(A) Locus
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Existence of at least one equilibrium of the conditional dynamic system (35) has been shown
in the previous proposition. For any t < t0 the equilibrium is unique since HH0 (At) > ½
8a 2 [a(A);1] and the loci HH (At) and TT necessarily intersect only once. For t ¸ t0, multiple
equilibria may arise if HH (A) is ﬂatter than TT in some range of the support. Thus, at t0 two
scenarios are possible depending on the nature of the unique equilibrium. If HH(A0;aI
A0) <
TT(aI
A0), the unique equilibrium is of type H since, by deﬁnition of aI
A as inﬂection point, the
two loci TT and HH intersect in the convex part of HH (A): This is the case if and only if
the concave part of HH (A) is suﬃciently small, which is true if the ﬁx cost of acquiring human
capital H, e is suﬃciently small. In this case, nothing prevents agents from acquiring high
quality human capital from early stages on, and the economy develops smoothly as A increases
overtime. In the other scenario, HH(A0;aI
A0) ¸ TT(aI
A0), so the unique equilibrium at t0 is
of type S. In this case, acquiring H is individually costly in an underdeveloped economy, or,
equivalently, e is suﬃciently large to generate a development trap. The economy is characterized
by a lengthy sequence of S-equilibria which is eventually followed by a development process. The
proof follows from the incremental increase in TFP by Lemma 1 implying that the equilibria of
the conditional system can be characterinzed in terms of A instead of t.
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